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For a Refutation of the Dialetheist Logic 
The élenchos is the ascertainment of the self-supersession of all negations of principle of
universal opposition of the positive and the negative. This brief note intends to show that
the dialetheist negation does not escape this self-supersession.
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1. Introduction
The point on which it is necessary to focus the attention when we are dis-
cussing about the principle of non-contradiction is the following: why
can’t we assert the identity of being and not-being? The denier of the first
principle, Aristotle notes, affirming, for example, that x «is a man and a
not-man», cannot exclude the corresponding negations: he will say that
x «is neither a man nor a not-man» (Metaph. IV, 4, 1008 a 4-7). If we
then consider the expression x «is a man and a not-man» as if it was a sin-
gle statement, then the opposite assertion too will be a single one, so that
the denier of the first principle will also have to claim that x «is not a man
and a not-man». Aristotle says that «our discussion with him is evidently
about nothing at all; for he says nothing. For he says neither ‘yes’ nor ‘no’,
but ‘yes and no’; and again he denies both of these and says ‘neither yes
nor no’; for otherwise there would already be something definite»
(Metaph. IV, 4, 1008 a 30-34). However, the denier of the first principle
could respond that, in this way, we are assuming what we should demon-
strate, namely that reality is determined, that it is consistent with the
classical logic and its implications. The argument would therefore be
flawed by a petition principii. Concerning the dialetheist negation things
become complicated since it claims there are cases in which the positive is
and is not the negative, that there are true and false statements, but not
statements that are neither true nor false. Except that, as we shall see now,
the winning move against the negation of the principium firmissimum,
including the specific position proposed by the dialetheist logic, is not
the one that contests the fact that it does not say anything (the contra-
diction is not, in fact, lack of meaning), but rather the observation that
the negation of the first principle is a negation of itself. It happens there-
fore that, in the words of Aristotle, «for while disowning reason», that is,
the transcendental value of non-contradiction, the denier too «listens to
reason» (Metaph. IV, 4, 1006 a 26), declaring his non-existence. The
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process that shows the incontrovertibility of that “logos” «which every
one must have who understands anything that is» (Metaph. IV, 3, 1005b,
16-17), is the élenchos. One who has examined its structure, more than
anyone else, is Emanuele Severino in the very famous VI paragraph of Re-
turning to Parmenides (see Severino, 2016, pp. 59-80). 
2. The élenchos and its figures
Severino identifies two fundamental figures of the élenchos: the first one
evokes the Aristotelian formulation of the argument, but with the warn-
ing that the sense of identity and of non-contradiction, as it shows itself
in the primal structure of the truth, which implies the eternity of being
(see Goggi, 2019), is in its essence different from the one that appears in
the nihilistic context marked by the temporal understanding of being, in-
side which the very inquiry of the Stagirite moves; the second one an-
swers to solicitations which are not present in the Aristotelian text, but
crucial in order to finalise the structure of the élenchos, permanently.  
2.1. The first figure
The first figure of the élenchos is made of two assertions: [a] «the negation
of the determinate is a determinate» and [b] «the negation of the deter-
minate is negation of the determinate which is the negation itself» (see
Severino, 2016, pp. 72-73). The “determinate” is the same identity-op-
position of being, where being is the positive, that is, every non-nothing,
and the determinateness of being is its not being other than itself, where
the other than the considered being, its negative, is an anything else, that
is, everything that, in different ways, is not the positive considered. It
should be noted that the elenctic strategy does not consist of saying, sim-
ply, that that positive that is the negation of the opposition is contradic-
tory, thereby assuming what we intend to show; what is crucial is the ob-
servation that, «if the opposition is, in any way, denied and the negation
is to be negation […] then the negation is opposed to its negative; that is,
it holds firm in that meaning for the sake of which it is negation, and dif-
ferentiates this meaning from all other meanings» (Severino, 2016, p.
61). The negation of the opposition is removed since it is shown that
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«such negation fails to live as negation, because in the act in which it con-
stitutes itself as negation it is at once also affirmation. And so it is, most
definitely, contradictory: but the negation is not supersedes insofar as it
is formally ascertained to be contradictory – the negation is supersedes
insofar as it is ascertained that it fails to posit itself as negation, unless it
grounds itself upon that which it denies, and so only if it denies itself.
The negation, failing to free itself from that which it denies, becomes its
very bearer; not only does it fail to tear what it denies off its back, so that
it can then hold it at arm’s length and condemn it, but what it thinks it
has before it and has condemned, actually stands behind it and directs all
its thoughts, including the thought that announces the condemnation.
The law of Being is the destiny of thought, and thought is always witness
to this law; always affirming it, even when ignorant of it or when denying
it» (Severino, 2016, pp. 64-65). Holding firmly in itself, the negation of
the opposition opposes its negative: denying the principle of the opposi-
tion of the negative and the positive, the negation denies therefore what
without which it would not exist, that is to say, it denies itself. 
2.2. The second figure
The second figure of the élenchos answers to a solicitation that is not pres-
ent in the Aristotelian text: what happens if the negation recognizes to be
something determinate – and therefore not to be other than itself – and
it limits itself to affirm the existence of a contradictory reality (in which
the being is other than itself ) outside the semantic area of which the
negation itself consists? The diriment investigation is operated by the sec-
ond figure of the élenchos that is composed, too, of two assertions: [a]
«the negation of the opposition is (affirmation of the) opposition» and
[b] ] «the negation of the opposition is negation of the opposition that is
part of the negation of the opposition» and therefore it is the negation of
itself (see Severino, 2016, pp. 75-76). In this way, the élenchos receives the
maximum extension that belongs to it. Severino writes: «The élenchos is
the ascertainment of the determinateness of the negation of the opposi-
tion (where “determinateness” means nothing other than the positive’s
property of being opposed to its negative). This determinateness is prop-
er both to the negation, considered as a semantic unity with respect to
everything that is other than the negation, and to the single terms that
make up the negation. If the negation does not remain distinct from its
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other, there is no longer negation; if each term of the negation is not dis-
tinct from every other term (as occurs when no difference is posited be-
tween red and green, i.e. when red is affirmed to be green) again there is
no negation (for if the terms are not seen to be different, positing a dif-
ference between them would be a negation of the opposition). In order
for there to be negation, the negation must be determinate, both with re-
spect to its other, and in the term that constitutes it; and therefore it pre-
supposes and is grounded upon that which it denies» (Severino, 2016,
pp. 67-68). In other words, in order for there to be negation of the op-
position, and therefore the difference of the differing is denied, such a
difference needs to appear and therefore to be affirmed, so that the nega-
tion is, contradictorily, a denying and an affirming the same, in which
the checkmate operated by the élenchos does not actually reside in show-
ing that the negation of the difference is contradictory (notwithstanding
that it is, since it denies and affirms the same), but instead in detecting
that the negation of the difference of the differing cannot constitute itself
unless it assumes what it denies. If in the first figure of the élenchos the
negation of the determinate presents itself as the affirmation of a part of
the totality of the determinate that is denied, that is, the one the negation
itself consists of, in the second figure the negation of the determinate
presents itself as the affirmation of the totality of the determinate that is
denied. It shall be said then that the principle of the opposition of the
positive and the negative is at the foundation of every thought: it also
founds its own negation, not in the sense that it validates it, but in the
sense that, if the negation of the opposition – whatever the form in which
it presents itself is – would not pose at its foundation the opposition, it
could not even exist: it is founded on what it denies, and therefore it de-
nies itself. 
3. The élenchos of the dialetheist negation
But how does all of this apply to the dialetheist denier? It seems indeed
that he manages to avoid the elenctic “trap”, inviting to consider the pos-
sibility that some contradictions are true (we are then in the situation
considered by the second figure of the élenchos), where however the op-
position is not simply denied, but it is both affirmed and denied, therefore
there can be a case of a positive (any being) that is and is not its negative
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(what is other than the considered being). In this case we would be deal-
ing with a negation that does not mean the simple “exclusion” (that is,
the exclusion that is not also non-exclusion), but with a negation that is
exclusionary but also not exclusionary, for this is precisely what is peculiar
to the dialetheist position. In response to this, we shall consider again the
ultimate meaning of the élenchos. We have seen that the negation of the
opposition of positive and negative presupposes and is founded on what
it denies, and therefore it denies itself; and this happens also in the case
of that specific negation of the opposition that is the so called “true con-
tradiction”, where the positive is thought as what is and is-not the nega-
tive. Severino writes: «In thinking that the positive is and is-not the neg-
ative, one denies that the positive is not negative […] not simply in the
sense that “the positive is and is-not the negative” includes “the positive
is not the negative” – for, in this sense, the opposition is indeed denied,
but is also affirmed – but in the sense that, in affirming-denying the op-
position, one denies it insofar as it is an object simpliciter of affirmation,
insofar, that is, as it refuses to become, at the same time, an object of
negation. If the thought that the positive is and is-not the negative is a
denial, in the sense we have indicated, of the positive’s not being nega-
tive, i.e., is an identification of the positive and the negative, then we find
again, at the root of this thought, that negation of the opposition which
the élenchos supersedes by ascertaining (as in the case of the affirmation
“red is green”) that it grounded upon the affirmation of that which it de-
nies» (Severino, 2016, p. 68). The dialetheist denier responds that «if we
have […] to deal with a true contradiction, as believe those who affirm
and deny the opposition, the truth of the claim that the positive categor-
ically and in every way refuses to enter into a synthesis with its negative
is unable to exclude the truth of the contradictory proposition» (Costan-
tini, 2018, p. 866). This being the case, we are dealing with a positive
that is not only other than its negative. Therefore, Severino says well: «in
affirming-denying the opposition, one denies it insofar as it is an object
simpliciter of affirmation». In fact, the dialetheist “true contradiction” is
such only because the affirmation enters into synthesis with the negation,
that is, denying the opposition insofar as it refuses to place itself in such
a synthesis. Now, it should be noted that if it did not deny the opposition
like this, we would not be dealing with a “true contradiction”. And it is use-
less to repeat that such a negation is not able to be exclusionary: we would
only repeat the same structure of the “true contradiction” that is in itself
– «at the root of this thought» – identification of the positive and the
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negative. However, the élenchos is able to remove (in the meaning that
has been described) the negation of the opposition, and therefore also
that kind of limited negation that is the dialetheist negation, highlight-
ing that it is founded too on what it denies. The dialetheism is caught in
its being negation of the opposition: in its being this “at the root”, in the
indicated sense. By removing the root, that is, observing that it is self-re-
moval, the élenchos removes what is rooted in it.  
4. Conclusion
In conclusion, every negation of the principle of the opposition of posi-
tive and negative – which is then the principle of the difference of the dif-
fering – is founded on the appearing of the difference, so that such a
negation, of which the dialetheist negation is a particular kind, denies it-
self; and it is precisely for this reason, that is, because that negation is self-
negation, that it is necessary that being appears just as indicated by the lan-
guage that testifies the primal structure. To this should be added that the
thought that contradicts itself «is not a thinking nothing, but is a thinking
the Nothing. The identity of the positive and the negative […] is that
which is-not […]. And insofar as Nothing lets thought look at it, it dons
the mantle of the positive» (Severino, 2016, p. 79). So, we must distin-
guish between the contradiction and the content which is affirmed by
the contradiction. This content is what is impossible, the absolute Noth-
ing, while the contradiction, that affirms the nothing, is not a nothing.
«Any contradiction – like, for that matter, the very meaning “nothing” –
constitutes the positive meaning of Nothing» (ivi) and any contradiction
must be denied because of its meaning.
Footnote  
The dialetheist frequently refers to self-referential statements in order to
justify the existence of contradictory dimensions. And the most popular
of those statements is the paradox of the liar: “What I affirm is false”. If
that statement is true, then it is false; if it is false, then it is true. In closing
this brief note, I would like to point out the solution Severino himself
gave to this paradox: «Even if we admitted temporarily the validity of
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these two inferences [if it is true then it is false; if it is false then it is true],
however, we should conclude that the self-referential statement is a con-
tradiction, and that therefore what exists is the contradiction, the contra-
dicting oneself, not the content of the contradiction, that is, the contra-
dictory content, which is invalid, the impossible […]. However, the va-
lidity […] of the two inferences related to the self-referential statements
such as “What I affirm is false” (we shall indicate with q this statement)
does not exist. The premises of the two inferences – if q is true (then it is
false), if q is false (then it is true) – are actually negations of the primal
structure of the destiny of truth. As a matter of fact it is impossible that
q (that is, the affirmation of being false) belongs to the destiny of truth,
that is, it is impossible to suppose […] that it is true (on the basis of the
authentic meaning of the truth); and it is impossible to suppose that q is
false, since the supposition coexists with the opposite supposition, while
q is necessarily and originally false: q denies itself […]. The impossibility
of the two premises makes therefore impossible the two conclusions that
would have to show the opposite of the premises» (Severino, 2019, pp.
280-283).
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